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Visuomotor control: Where does vision end and action begin?
Melvyn A. Goodale
A new understanding of how visual information is
transformed into motor acts has emerged from recent
studies of the organization of the visuomotor pathways
in the primate brain. This work suggests that it may no
longer be useful, or even correct, to categorize different
brain areas as sensory or motor.
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In classical physiology and psychology, a sharp division is
often drawn between sensory and motor systems. Whole
sections of undergraduate textbooks are devoted to vision,
for example, and these chapters are quite separate from
those discussing how the motor system works. Similar
divisions exist in scientific societies and symposia — and
sometimes within university departments. It is true that
one can find the occasional book that talks about ‘sensori-
motor integration’ and the occasional society that brings
together researchers from both fields but, in general,
sensory and motor systems remain two solitudes.
A strong argument can be made, however, that the study of
sensory and motor systems should not be separated. Con-
sider for a moment the relationship between vision and the
motor output it controls. Although it might be convenient
to talk about visual cortex on the one hand and motor
cortex on the other, there is no particular point along the
many routes between the retina and the muscles where
signals stop being sensory and suddenly become motor.
From the moment signals from the photoreceptors enter
the central nervous system, the information they convey is
on its way to being transformed into motor output. This is
not mere semantics. The artificial division of the brain into
visual and motor areas, and the mutual isolation of the
intellectual traditions that study them, have led to theories
of brain function that are quite misleading.
Over fifteen years ago, for example, Ungerleider and
Mishkin [1] identified two visual pathways, or ‘streams of
processing’, in the cerebral cortex of the monkey: a ventral
stream projecting from the primary visual cortex (V1) to
the inferotemporal cortex, and a dorsal stream projecting
from V1 to the posterior parietal cortex (see Figure 1). In
what was to become one of the most influential theories in
behavioural neuroscience, Ungerleider and Mishkin
proposed that the ventral stream mediates object vision,
enabling the monkey to identify an object, while the dorsal
stream mediates spatial vision, enabling the monkey to
locate the object. Notice that the emphasis here is on a dif-
ference in sensory processing, with one stream handling
information about an object’s features (the ‘what’ pathway)
and the other handling information about its spatial loca-
tion (the ‘where’ pathway). 
Over the past decade the ‘what versus where’ story has
begun to unravel — largely because it treats the dorsal and
ventral streams as purely ‘visual’ pathways. New evidence,
from work with both monkeys and neurological patients,
has shown that a purely sensory account simply will not
work (reviewed in [2]). The only way to make sense of
these new findings is to pay as much attention to the
outputs of the two streams as to their inputs — and to
work out how visual information is eventually transformed
into motor acts. The utility of this approach is perhaps
most clearly seen in relation to the dorsal stream. 
Ever since the pioneering studies of Mountcastle [3],
Hyvärinen [4], and their colleagues, it has been known that
neurons in different areas of the dorsal stream are activated
both by visual stimulation and by the concurrent behaviour
of the monkey. Separate subsets of visually sensitive cells
in the posterior parietal cortex, the major terminal zone for
the dorsal stream, have been shown to be implicated in
visual fixation, pursuit and saccadic eye movements, visu-
ally guided reaching, and the manipulation of objects. In
reviewing these studies, Andersen [5] has pointed out that
most neurons in these areas “exhibit both sensory-related
and movement-related activity”. These observations,
coupled with the fact that lesions in this region in both
monkeys and humans produce deficits in visually-guided
arm and eye movements, have led to the view that the
dorsal stream is in the business of transforming visual
inputs into skilled motor acts [2,6]. It is not so much a visu-
ospatial pathway as a complex network of visuomotor
modules interconnected with other cortical and subcortical
structures concerned with sensorimotor control.
The idea that the dorsal stream might be specialized for
visuomotor control, rather than spatial vision, has not been
universally accepted, however. Some researchers have
argued that the neuronal activity in the dorsal stream
simply reflects some sort of attentional modulation of basic
visuospatial processing. After all, the fact that the animal is
looking at a visual stimulus, or reaching towards it, must
mean that it is attending to it (discussed in [2]). This atten-
tional hypothesis has recently been challenged by Ander-
sen and his colleagues [7], in an elegant experiment in
which they trained monkeys to memorize the location of
peripherally flashed lights and to plan either an eye move-
ment or a reaching movement to that location, depending
on the colour of the light that was flashed. 
Andersen and colleagues [7] recorded from cells in the pos-
terior parietal cortex that had visual receptive fields corre-
sponding to the location of the peripheral targets. Many of
these cells maintained their activity during the ‘memory
period’ after the visual stimulus had been removed. But
whether the cells remained active depended on the move-
ment that animal was intending to make. Some cells were
active only when the animal was planning an eye move-
ment, and others were active only when the animal was
planning an arm movement. This result suggests that the
activity in the cell reflects the animal’s intention to make a
particular motor act, rather than a general attentional mod-
ulation. If the activity in the cell were simply related to
attention, then the activity should be indifferent to the
type of movement the animal planned to make.
Not surprisingly, in these experiments the activity related
to intended eye movements was recorded in a different
anatomical area of the posterior parietal cortex from that
related to intended arm movements. As mentioned earlier,
the posterior parietal cortex contains a complex mosaic of
different areas, each of which is related to a different kind
of motor output. The segregation into different areas
probably reflects the requirement of different motor
outputs for different transformations of the incoming
visual information. Moving the eyes to look at an object,
for example, requires that information about the location
of the object be coded in eye-based, or perhaps head-
based, coordinates. Moving the hand to pick up the
object, however, requires that information about the loca-
tion, shape, size and orientation of the object be coded
(eventually at least) in limb, hand and, perhaps, finger-
based coordinates. But how is the control of these differ-
ent motor acts coordinated? The production of a complex
action such as hitting a tennis ball must presumably
involve the orchestration of activity in a number of differ-
ent areas of the posterior parietal cortex, as the eyes follow
the ball and the racket is swung so as to contact the ball
with the racket’s ‘sweet spot’.
Some insight into how this orchestration might be
achieved also comes from Andersen’s laboratory. Ander-
sen and colleagues [8] have recently demonstrated that
some ‘reaching’ cells in the posterior parietal cortex
appear to code the location of the visual target in eye-
centred coordinates, the same coordinate frame used by
eye movement cells in other regions of the posterior pari-
etal cortex. Surprisingly, the same eye-centred coding is
evident when monkeys are trained to reach in the dark to
auditory targets — even though, theoretically, head-
centred auditory signals could be converted directly into
limb coordinates. It appears as if the various sensorimotor
transformations carried out in different regions of the
posterior parietal cortex share a common and distributed
reference frame — an eye-centred lingua franca that can
be used to orchestrate their activities. Andersen and
colleagues have shown that the gain of this eye-centred
coding can be modulated by eye, head and limb position
signals, presumably as a first step towards the final conver-
sion into effector-specific coordinates. 
All of this, of course, is consistent with the notion that the
dorsal stream is an action pathway — a pathway con-
cerned with converting visual inputs directly into motor
outputs. But what about the ventral stream? Surely, here
we have a pathway that is fundamentally more visual, one
that is quite remote from the production of motor
outputs. In contrast to the dorsal ‘action’ stream, the
ventral stream has been characterized as the pathway that
provides our visual perception of objects and events in
the world, providing a foundation for cognitive operations
[2,6]. Indeed, without the ventral stream, it has been
argued, we would have no experience of the visual
world — no percepts of objects and events beyond our
bodies. But it is important to remember that perception
by itself is of no use at all. To be useful, perception must
ultimately result in the production of a motor act. What
seems to be different in the ventral stream is that the link
between visual input and the final motor output is much
less immediate than it is in the dorsal stream. 
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Figure 1
Major routes by which the retinal input reaches the dorsal and ventral
streams. The diagram of the macaque brain (inset) shows the
approximate routes of the cortico-cortical projections from the
primary visual cortex to the posterior parietal and the inferotemporal
cortex, respectively. 
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In fact, the two streams work together in the production of
purposive behaviour. Consider for a moment the simple
act of picking up a cup of coffee. The rich and detailed
perception of the world provided by our ventral stream
enables us to identify the cup from all the other objects in
the scene. But having helped us to identify our cup and
where it is on our desk, the perception of the visual scene
provided by the ventral stream is of little use in helping us
program the actual movements required to pick up the
cup. The metrics of perception are relative, not absolute
— a fact which explains why we have no difficulty watch-
ing television, a medium in which there are no absolute
metrics at all, and everything is relative. 
But relative metrics, although computationally convenient
when dealing with many objects in a scene, are of only
limited use in controlling actions directed at a particular
object in that scene. To pick up your coffee cup, it is not
enough to know that it is further away from you than the
bowl of cornflakes and closer to you than the jar of
marmalade. The neural systems programming and control-
ling your grasping movement must have access to accurate
metrical information about the location of the cup.
Furthermore, that information must be computed in
egocentric frames of reference — in other words, frames of
reference that take into account the instantaneous position
of your arm, hand and fingers. This is just the sort of
computation for which the dorsal stream is superbly
equipped — as we saw earlier in the work of investigators
from Mountcastle to Andersen.
What must happen then is something like this. Once the
cup has been ‘flagged’ by the perceptual networks in our
ventral stream, it is the visuomotor networks in the dorsal
stream that actually compute the location, size, shape and
orientation of the cup in egocentric coordinates, and
convert that information into a well-formed and calibrated
grasping movement that is directed at the cup [9]. The
dorsal stream computes all this on-line by a ‘first principles’
analysis of a local part of the visual array. But the ventral
stream, through its connections with long-term memory
and other cognitive processes, will influence the motor
output in other ways, for example by providing information
about the weight of the cup or whether it is full of
coffee — information that can be understood only on the
basis of previous experience. This information can then be
used to calibrate the initial grip and lift forces that are
applied to the cup once contact is achieved — a computa-
tion that is known to depend on visual information [10].
Both streams, then, transform visual information into
motor output. In the dorsal stream, the transformation is
direct: visual input and motor output are essentially ‘iso-
morphic’ with one another. In the ventral stream,
however, the transformation is quite indirect: the relation-
ship between input and output is ‘propositional’, and
takes into account previous knowledge and experience.
The ventral stream helps us identify goals and plan
actions; the dorsal stream programs and controls those
actions. This interplay between a ‘smart’ but metrically-
challenged ventral stream and a ‘dumb’ but metrically-
accurate dorsal stream is reminiscent of the interaction
between the human operator and a semi-autonomous
robot in what engineers call teleassistance — where a
human operator looks at a scene, say the surface of a
hostile planet, makes a decision that a particular rock
needs to be examined, and then sends a command to pick
up the rock to a semi-autonomous robot on the planet’s
surface [11]. The robot then uses its range finders and
other on-board devices to program the movements of its
actuators to pick up the rock.
This kind of thinking is not something that would easily
emerge in a discipline that treats sensory systems and
motor systems as separate entities. In fact, perhaps the
time has come to stop thinking about the brain in terms of
sensory and motor systems, and to focus instead on how
the brain transforms sensory inputs into useful motor acts.
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